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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CO~CRETE PRODUCTS, INC., 
,, ;o STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
SECOND INJURY FUND AND 
:':DUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 19272 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
SECOND INJURY FUND & 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Writ of Review from an order of the Industrial 
~onunission of Utah. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The defendants Second Injury Fund and Industrial Commission 
concur in the Statement of the Disposition contained in the brief 
of the plaintiff State Insurance Fund. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants respectfully request that this court affirm 
the order of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants concur in the Statement of Facts con-
: ced in the brief of the plaintiff State Insurance Fund. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The issue on appeal is whether the State Insurance 
Fund, the Worker's Compensation Carrier, is entitled to a 
reimbursement from the defendant Second Injury Fund for 
~£d1cal expenses and temporary total disability benefits 
~a:d by the insurance carrier to the applicant Frederick 
"aulus on claims filed on several industrial accidents. 
ARGUMENT 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
UTAH \'IORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT TO HOLD THE PLAINTIFF 
STATE INSURA.'\JCE FUND LIABLE AS THE WORKER'S COMPEN-
SATION INSURANCE CARRIER FOR ALL THE MEDICAL EXPENSES 
AND TEMPORARY DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR LOSS TIME FROM 
l'IORK AS A RESULT OF THE INDUSTRIAL INCIDENTS. 
The plaintiff insurance company erroneously argues that 
Lased upon the current August 12, 1978 industrial accident, the 
rnployer's insurance carrier should be entitled to reimbursement 
"rom the defendant Second Injury Fund at 7/13ths or 53.8% of 
011 medical and temporary disability benefits paid by the carrier 
011 che 1978 industrial injuries because the injured worker had a 
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pre-existing condition, although the prior incapacities of the 
low back and (L) knee were found to be unrelated to the industr 1 , 
injuries and the current industrial incapacity was !l2! sub.sta·•t 
greater than it would have been had the injured worker not h~: 
the pre-existing incapacities. 
Based upon the record, the Administrative Law Judge 
specifically found that the current 1978 industrial incapacity 
was not made "substantially greater than" by the applicant's 
pre-existing condition: 
. Section 35-1-69, U. C. A., which says that the 
industrial injury must "result in permanent incapaciL 
which is substantially greater than he would have · 
incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacit·' 
We cannot find in this case that the industrial injur:, 
resulted in a substantially greater permanent incapac: 
as a result of the pre-existing condition when a 
completely different part of the body is involved and 
the applicant at the time of the 1978 incident had nc 
significant complaints or complications with either 
his back or his knee which parts of the body had the 
pre-existing problems noted by Dr. Holbrook. The reel. 
Supreme Court case of USF&G v. Anderton, dated Januar; 
1983 breathed a new life into the "substantially great• 
provision making it again a viable principal." 
Emphasis Added. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page six, dated 
February 7, 1983 (R. 215). 
In the above entitled matter, the Industrial Commissio~.: 
Utah has ruled that since the applicant's medical expenses and 
temporary disability benefits arose from the 1978 industrial e•:s·· 
the payment of such benefits was the exclusive responsibility o~· 
employer or its insurance carrier, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.' 
Sections 35-1-45, 69 and 81. The position taken by the Commisc' 
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is that before the plaintiff insurance carrier is entitled to 
11 ,;· reimbursement against the defendant Second Injury Fund under 
'tJh Code Ann., Section 35-1-69 for benefits paid to the injured 
,,rkcr on said accidents, the compensation insurance carrier is 
,cguLred to show that the pre-existing incapacities made the 
"iustrial injuries "substantially greater than" they would have 
been "but for" the previous incapacities. Day's Market Inc. v. 
11uir, 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). See also. u. s. F. & G. v. 
Industrial Corrunission, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983); Kincheloe v. 
Coca-cola Bottlino Co. of Ogden, 656 P.2d 440 (Utah 1982). 
This Court has set forth the test for involving the 
defendant Second Injury Fund under Section 69 as follows: 
"Explicit statutory authority exists to apportion 
compensation awards and medical costs between employers 
and the Second Injury Fund, provided pertinent conditions 
are met. Basically, those conditions are three in 
number: 1) permanent incapacity occasioned by accid-
ental injury, disease or congenital causes, followed by 
2) subsequent (industrial) injury resulting in further 
permanent incapacity which is 3) substantially greater 
than that which would have been incurred had there been 
no pre-existing incapacity. . . The Corrunission is 
statutorily obligated to determine whether the subsequent 
injuries sustained . . have resulted in further 
permanent incapacity which is substantially greater. 
Emphasis Added. 
l. S. F. & G. v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
This Court conclusively resolved the issue of "substanially 
1reater than" in Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, supra. In Day's Market 
t~,e Commission denied the insurance carrier reimbursement under 
tion 69 because the carrier had failed to show that the pre-exis•ing 
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incapacity had the "effect" of substantially increasing the 
current industrial injury. The Court held: 
(Second Injury) Fund's only application is when, lLc 
current incapacity is substantially greater ... 
this language requires a finding as to the effect 1 
pre-existing incapacity has upon the current incap~c _1 
Findings in the abstract as to the total pre-existin1 
incapacity are of little assistance in making this 
determination, since the full responsiblity falls ucc-
the current employer (or carrier) unless it can be s~;·c 
that the current incapacity is substantially greater 
than it would have been "but for" the pre-existing 
incapacity. 
Da~'s Market, Inc. v. Muir, 669 P.2d 440(Utah 1983). 
This ruling requires a finding that the subsequent 
industrial injury was made substantially greater by the Fre-e:-::s:. 
incapacity. In u. S. F. & G. and Day's Market the Commission 
denied the worker's compensation insurance carrier any reimburse· 
ment from the defendant on the basis that the pre-existing condL 
did not make the industrial injuries substantially greater than 
they would have been otherwise. Very simply, the Commission 
denied reimbursement to the carriers because all of the rnedica'. 
and temporary disability benefits resulted from the industrial 
accidents only, which were the sole responsibility of the empic, 0 
insurance carrier. 
This same logic applies in the instant case on the gro•Jc: 
that the applicant's pre-existing incapacities did not contnc-:' 
to or "effect" the need of medical treatment or temporary tota; 
disability caused by the industrial injury. In the case at t;r. 
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ir1; u1 l'd worker (Frederick J, Paulus) sustained multiple 
11 1 c" to both his shoulders and head from an industrial 
L .L occurring on August 12, 1978 when his truck lost control, 
,.,,,l:Jankment and flipped over (R. 31), The applicant was 
·.·.11 l rom the vehicle and was pinned under the driving axle . 
.. as Lnunediately taken to the Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital 
'ar examination. Following the event he was treated by Dr. Neal C. 
2 cl and Dr. D. Ross McNaught in Cedar City, Utah for problems 
- lath the (R) and (L) shoulders. Due to the 1978 industrial 
,. ec,t t!w applicant underwent surgery for his left shoulder in 
·;01.·ember of 1978 (R. 210); surgery on his right shoulder in 
0 ccruary of 1979 (R. 211); and then his left shoulder was re-
~rated on in 1979. There is no evidence in the record to show 
:.-.3t the pre-existing conditions of the applicant's (L) knee or 
:o~ back acted upon the (L) and (R) shoulder injuries to make them 
S'l!.stant ially greater than they would have been otherwise. 
Based upon the above 1978 industrial accident and the 
.-:c~ies sustained thereby, the compensation insurance carrier 
~la.~t1ff State Insurance Fund) paid compensation benefits for 
:•e 0 t11.~ his shoulder and head injuries. Now the plaintiff 
erroneously seeks reimbursement against the defendant on the 
~r~unds that pursuant to Section 69 the industrial injuries (both 
'~o~lder and head) should be added in some "additive analysis" 
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with the pre-existing conditions (left knee and low back) so 
2
s 
to require the Second Injury Fund to pay for 7/13th or 53.81. cf 
the medical costs and temporary disability benefits incurre~ , 
treating the injured worker's shoulder problems caused hy t~. 
industrial accident. Such a contention is contrary to the ste: 
and this Court's interpretation of what the statute requires. 
Clearly, the statute requires a showing of how the prier 
incapacitites have acted upon the current industrial injury :o 
make the industrial impairment substantially greater than it 
would have been "but for" the previous incapacity: 
(1) If any employee who has previously incurred a 
perraanent incapacity . . sustains an industrial in11· 
. that results in permanent incapacity which is · 
substantially greater than he would have incurred if 
he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, compensat::· 
and medical care . . shall be awarded on the basis c' 
the combined injuries, but the liability of of the 
employer for such compensation and medical care shaL :o 
for the industrial injury only. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69. 
The plaintiff erroneously applies an additive analvsis 
to the above statute to argue that the defendant ought to pay 
7/13th of all the benefits flowing from the industrial injuEes. 
Such an application is contrary to this Court's ruling in~ 
~, supra, and Day's Market, supra. The plaintiff again 
misinterprets the ruling in Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 
of Ogden, 656 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1982) to argue that the cause anc 
effect is not important in showing how the industrial injun 
resulted in a permanent incapacity which is substantially arc 
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it would have been "but for" the pre-existing condition. 
The standard.announced.and applied in Ortega, is a 
simple addit~ve analysis of the "substantially greater 
requirement, rather than a causal analysis. That is unde~ Ortega, it is immaterial whether the pre-existi~g 
condition causes the permanent incapacity resulting from 
the industrial inJury to be greater than it otherwise 
would be . . This analysis was recently confirmed in 
Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden, 656 P.2d 
440 (1982) . Commenting on this point, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Under the reasoning of Capitano, the fact that the 
1980 injury is unrelated to the 1974 injury is not 
dispositive. Irrespective of any causal connection, 
the Second Injury Fund is to compensate one who 
sustains "permanent incapacity which is substantially 
greater than he would have incurred if he had not 
had the pre-existing incapacity." 656 P.2d 442 (note 
dropped, emphasis added). 
Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, Pages 7 & 8. 
Kincheloe does not stand for such a proposition, nor does 
it confirm it. On the contrary, Kincheloe ruled that the employer's 
.r,surance carrier was not entitled to rembursement because "it was 
!casonable for the law judge to conclude that plaintiff did not 
sustain "permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than 
:~ ~ould have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity." 
'J:cc~eloe held that the Second Injury Fund had no application 
":h.ere the Commission made such a finding supported by substantial 
e··16enco and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
The plaintiff State Insurance Fund, the worker's compen-
cation insurance carrier in this matter, continues to argue that 
3 line of cases stand for an erroneous standard that the insurance 
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carriers ought to be reimbursed where the injured worker had 
some form of pre-existing condition even though the prcv u'us 
incapacity did not make the current industrial injury sut~st~.:." 
greater than. Such an argument is not supported by Utah case ld, 
The purpose of the statute was obviously to require a 
"substantially greater than" test. This test continues to recccLL 
a "but for" analysis, see Day's Market, Inc., supra, OR a 
"relationship or interrelationship" between the current industrio 
injury and all the prior incapacities to show whether the indus~: 
incapacity is substantially greater than it would have been othe:-
wise. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, SG2 P.2d 617 
(Utah 1977). See also. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitanc, 
610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980). 
In Ortega this Court found a "relationship" between Ue 
industrial pain problems and the pre-existing psychiatric impai:-
ment to rule that such an "increase" in the ind us tr ia 1 injury 
satisfies the substantially greater test. Capitano held that t'e 
combined "effects" or the "interrelationsip" of both the previous 
condition and the industrial injury entitled the applicant to a: 
award on the theory that the shifting of weight from the currer: 
injury of the right ankle to the prior Korean War injury of the 
left leg established an "interrelationship" between the two in::. 
to justify a finding that the previous injury adversely affectec 
his industrial injury. 
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In White v. Industrial Commission, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979) 
~c•~ rourt set forth the method of apportioning liability in paying 
<its once it was determined that the "substantially greater than" 
1cJu1rement under Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69 was met. In 
~c?hie v. U. S. Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504 (Utah 1976), this Court 
held that the defendant Second Injury Fund was responsible for a 
~roportionate share of the liability for a permanent injury which 
could be ''partially attributable" to a pre-existing condition. 
Regarding the apportionment of liability on death claims, the 
Court ruled that the statute creating the Second Injury Fund, 
rtah Code Ann., Section 35-1-68, does not allow for an apportion-
1'ent of liability or reir.ibursement on death claims. Pittsburgh 
Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1982). 
The more recent cases have clearly required a showing of 
"substantially greater than" in order to invoke liability against 
t~~ defendant Second Injury Fund. 
u. s. F. & G. v. Industrial Commission, supra, set forth 
~e elements of entitlement under Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69 
~sr ~re-existing conditions: "Basically, those conditions are three 
:r number: 1) (previous) incapacity ... followed by 2) subsequent 
icr.dustrial) injury . which is 3) substantially greater than 
that which would have been incurred had there been no pre-existing 
~capacity. As the Court observed in Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola 
b~ttling Co., supra, the fact that the prior injury is unrelated 
_c 1. ,t dispositive. However, the Second Injury Fund is to compensate 
cr.l'.' one who sustains permanent incapacity which is substantially 
srcater than he would have had otherwise. 
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The requirement of showing "substantially greater thac" 
is clearly stated in the Kincheloe decision: 
"Under the reasoning of Capitano, the fact that the 
1980 injury is unrelated to the 1974 injury is not 
dispositive. Irrespective of any causal connection 
the Second Injury Fund is to compensate one who sus~a' 
"permanent incapacity which is substantially greater-
than he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-
existing incapacity. 
The law judge's primary reason for disallowinc 
compensation from the Second Injury Fund is, howeve; 
proper reasoning for the ruling under the statute .. ' 
Emphasis Added. 
Kincheloe v. Coca-Cola Bottling of Ogden, 656 P.2d 440 (Utah :ol: 
Kincheloe further stated that where the Commission mal:ec 
a specific finding that the cause of the applicant's need for 
benefits was from the industrial injury and that the pre-existir: 
condition did not make the industrial injury substantially grea:o 
than it would have been "but for" the pre-existing condition, t'.' 
Court should not upset such a finding where it is supported ~ 
substantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therE-
from. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Manfredi, 613 P.2d 888 (Utah 198c 
In the case at bar, the Administrative Law Judge, actir.: 
in behalf of the Utah Industrial Commission, made a specific Le .. 
that the pre-existing conditions (left knee and low back) did 
make the industrial injuries (left and right shoulder and heaG 
substantially greater than would have been otherwise: 
"This was a very complicated case . . All of the b 
problems either pre-existed the 19 7 8 (ind us trial" 
incident or were the result of a natural progress1 
degenerative problem thereafter. Since August 1~70 
(date of industrial accident) was the only bonaf1cE 
disabling industrial injury the progressive degenera 
of the back thereafter, rated at 5%, cannot be the 
basis of a recovery . . As to the 5', impairment 
-11- ---
back existing before August 1978 we have a more difficult 
question. The Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
applicant cannot recover from the Second Injury fund for 
the 5% impairment of the back as it existed prior to the 
August 1978 injury for three reasons: 
1. 
2. 
3. The third reason that there can be no recovery for 
the pre-existing impairment is the prohibition set 
forth in the statute itself, Section 35-1-69, which 
says that the industrial injury must "result in perman-
ent incapacity which is substantially greater than he 
would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing 
incapacity". We cannot find in this case that the 
industrial injury resulted in a substantially greater 
permanent incapacity as a result of the pre-existing 
condition when a completely different part of the body 
is involved and the applicant at the time of the 1978 
incident had no significant complaints or complication 
with either his back or his knee .•. " 
Emphasis Added. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 7, 
inJ. (R. 214, 215) 
The law judge's findings above are supported by substantial 
evidence and medical records: 
(1) There is not a medically demonstrable causal 
connection between the low back problems complained 
of and the industrial accident ... There is no 
evidence that any of the three accidents of 8-12-78, 
March 1981 or July 1981 have had any demonstrable 
lasting effects on his back condition. 
Emphasis Added. 
(P. 201) . 
Based upon the substantial evidence and reasonable inferences 
t" te drawn therefrom, the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
C~ITrission did not act arbitrarily or capriously in ruling that 
tLe industrial injury did not result in a substantially greater 
in~apacity because of the pre-existing condition. Consequently, 
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it was reasonble for the Administrative Law Judge to rule that 
the plaintiff insurance carrier was not entitled to a 7/13 er 
53.8% reimbursement from the defendant Second Injury Fund under 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69. 
In summary, the above stated statute and the cited Utah 
case law specifically require a showing of "substantially greate'.' 
before the employer or its insurance carrier is entitled to any 
reimbursement against the Second Injury Fund. The mere showing c' 
a pre-exisiting impairment rating is not sufficient grounds to 
require the defendant to reimburse the compensation insurance 
carrier for benefits paid on an industrial accident. This concL 
is directly supported by an old Utah case that is seldom cited ~ 
the parties. In Hafer' s Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 52.€ P.2d :· 
(Utah 1974), the employer's insurance carrier (State Insurance F,:· 
argued that it was solely liable for 75% of the medical costs a~ 
compensation benefits awarded to the injured worker. The insura::· 
carrier asserted that there was medical evidence to show that t~ 
injured worker had a prior disability which could fairly be rat~ 
at 25 per cent and it therefore relied on Section 35-1-69, U. c,: 
1953, to argue that 25% of the applicant's benefits should be 
awarded against Section 69. Hafer' s Inc. held that the Commissic 
did not act capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably, or in e~ 
of its authority in holding that the ind us trial injury complainc 
was the sole cause of the applicant's disability and that the 
compensation insurer was liable for the whole award, without ar,~ 
-13-
-~1rnbursement against the defendant Second Injury Fund, pursuant 
Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69, 
CONCLUSION 
Veyo Concrete Products, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund, the 
~bove entitled matter, represents a long list of cases appealed 
to the Utah Supreme Court where the insurance carrier is seeking 
re1ffibursement from the defendant on the basis that the claimants 
~,ac: a pre-existing "unrelated" impairment rating. State Insurance 
=un6 v. Second Injury Fund, Supreme Court No. 19694; Day's Market, 
v. Muir, Supreme Court No. 19782; U. S. F. & G. v. Industrial 
Commission, Supreme Court No. 19691; and Hall v. Second Injury Fund, 
Supreme Court No. 19 34 5. 
The Second Injury Fund petitioned the Court on a Writ of 
Re\·iew to interpret the 1981 amendments to Section 35-1-69 regarding 
a~ards of Permanent Partial Disability to applicants on "unaggravated, 
uuelated" pre-existing conditions and also, whether reimbursement 
co the employer's insurance carrier should be based upon ratable 
"~'pairments of "unaggravated, unrelated" pre-existing body parts. 
Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet and/or State Insurance Fund, 
Supreme Court no. 19595. 
The "substantially greater" requirement under the statute 
as not altered or omitted by the 1981 or 1984 amendments, Second 
=~iury Fund has been consistent in arguing that "before" any carrier 
Ls on titled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund, there must 
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be a showing under Section 35-1-69 (pre and post 1981 amendmer.t, 
that the industrial incapacity resulted in a substantially <;tt~, 
than incapacity than what the injured worker would have had if 
did not have the previous incapacity. Under Day's Market the :s 
requires a "but for" analysis, not an additive one: 
. this language requires a finding as to the effect 
the pre-existing incapacity has upon the current incap-
acity. Findings in the abstract as to the total pre-
existing are of little assistance in making this deter-
mination, since the full responsibility falls upon the 
current employer (or insurer) unless it can be said t:i 6 -
the current incapacity is substantially greater than tt-
would have been "but for" the pre-existing incapaci t~·." 
Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, 669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). 
Based upon the requirements of the "substantially greater 
under the statute and Utah case law, the plaintiff carrier int~:: 
case is not entitled to a 7/13ths reimbursement against the Secc 
Injury Fund. Hafer's Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 526 P.2d 11' 
(Utah 1974). See also. Day's Market, Inc. v. Muir, supra; C ' 
& G. v. Industrial Commission, supra; and Kincheloe v. Coca-co:e 
Bottling Co. of Ogden, supra. Good sense would preclude reimb~:-
carriers for benefits paid on injuries where the pre-existing 
problems contributed nothing to said industrial injuries. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff carrier has simply fat_ 
to show how the pre-existing left knee and low back conditions 
contributed to 53.8% of the benefits in treating the "right and 
left shoulder" industrial injuries. Hence, the Second Injury f · 
is only liable for benefits where the pre-existing incapacltv 
the effect of substantially contributing to a portion of the Le 
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f'G~ing from the industrial injury. By employing an additive 
11:sis, the plaintiff confuses the requirement of the statute 
_:1u1ng that under Section 69 the defendant Second Injury Fund 
dl~a~s liable for a portion of medicals and compensation without 
'bu_t for" analysis of how the previous incapacity made the 
_:.dustrial injury "substantially greater." 
The defendants respectfully request a ruling from the Court 
:~at the Second Injury Fund is only liable for benefits where the 
~re-~xisting incapacity has the effect of substantially contribut-
:J to a portion of the benefits caused by the current industrial 
In other words, as this Court has stated previously in 
·c,e cited cases, the statute (pre and post 1981 amendments) requires 
:cat the current industrial injury must result in a substantially 
;reater impairment because of the pre-existing condition before any 
is allowed. 
DATED THIS 
Gil-be.rt A. Martinez', 
Administrator and Attorney of he 
Second Injury Fund 
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